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CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
May 1, 2003 
There can be little doubt that, the U.S. invasion of Iraq notwithstanding, a combination of factors are 
conspiring to create a new sense of momentum impelling the Persian Gulf and the Middle East towards 
an era of profound economic and political change. The removal of Saddam may well be regarded as a 
signpost along this road in which all that happened during the last 20 years will bear little resemblance to 
what lies ahead. While the prospect of some sort of democratic entity inside Iraq may serve as a 
proximate cause towards some of the recent moves towards political reform, it is also the case that the 
ruling elites in the region, following their public opinion, are grasping the inevitability of political and 
economic transition in the new millennium. 
For the United States, an orderly transition process dovetails with long-held strategic and policy 
objectives to promote democracy, transparency and human rights throughout the region. During the 
1990s and the era of "containment," these objectives were largely subsumed by the focus on Saddam 
and by the Herculean and regrettably unsuccessful efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute. But now, the 
United States may get what it has been asking for, with consequences for regional security and stability 
that cannot be foreseen. Pictures of roiling, fervent crowds of Shi-ite religious pilgrims in Najaf and 
Karbala simultaneously beckons us back to images of the 1979 Shi-ite revolution in Iran while also 
impelling us forward into the unknown that will be Iraqi politics, if not the politics of the entire region in the 
post-Saddam era.  
 
Chaos and order may thus become one in the new emerging political landscape in which the friction of an 
emerging political process will tear down old walls and replace them with new and undefined structures. 
While the ruling Gulf elites have an abiding interest in controlling this process, the unleashing of populist-
style politics in Iraq may be a force that spills across borders, pushing the ruling elites in directions that 
they have so far proven reluctant to go. To head off such a possibility, however, useful and constructive 
attempts are being made to try to channel the process of political transition into orderly and peaceful 
channels. 
An Opening Act 
The elections in Bahrain in October 2002 (the first since the National Assembly was dissolved in 1975) 
could represent an opening act in this drama. Approximately 53 percent of the eligible 243,000 voters—
male and female—went to the polls to elect representatives of the 40-member parliament, called the 
House of Deputies. While marred by an Islamist boycott, the elections in Bahrain proceeded without 
significant protests or other actions to disrupt the process—in itself a victory in a political climate that has 
featured near continual and sometimes violent conflict between the ruling Sunni minority and the 
predominately Shia populace, which constitutes an estimated 75 percent of the population.  
Under the Bahraini bicameral system, the House of Deputies will be complemented by a 40-member 
upper house, called the Shura Council, composed of officials appointed by King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa. 
Representatives from Islamist religious parties now occupy 19 of the 40 seats in the lower house, while 
King Hamad has appointed a variety of secularists and free marketeers to the upper house, including 12 
traders, six women, several public servants as well as officials from the Bahrain Defence Force. The 
upper house retains the right to prevent any legislation from the lower house from reaching the palace. 
King Hamad retains the authority to veto any legislation as well as the right to appoint all government 
ministers.  
Bahrain's parliamentary system has been criticized by the main Islamist opposition group, Jamiat al Wifaq, 
as contrary to the country's 1973 constitution, which called for one popularly elected assembly. Others 
have questioned whether the system will allow the Shia majority to exercise meaningful political power, 
since final authority remains vested with the ruling al Khalifah family. It remains unclear whether Bahrain's 
experiment can manage the process of political transition, but there can be little doubt that that process, 
once started, will be difficult to reverse. 
Act II 
Voters in Qatar overwhelmingly approved a new 150-Article constitution on April 29th that will establish a 
45-seat advisory Shoura Council, fifteen members of which will be appointed by the Emir—Sheikh Hamad 
bin Khalifah al Thani. Legislative elections could come in 2004 or even sooner. The constitution 
establishes four-year terms for the 30 elected members; women will be eligible to run for office. The 
Shoura will have the right to draw up legislation, question cabinet ministers, review and vote on the 
government's budget proposals and debate decisions taken by the cabinet ministers—all of whom will still 
be appointed by the Emir, who remains the head of state. The Emir retains the right to veto legislation, 
but is also required to reconsider any vetoed bills that are resubmitted by the legislature within three 
months. The Emir can also dissolve the council, but under the constitution is obligated to call new 
elections within six months.  
In addition to the provisions for an elected council, the constitution explicitly guarantees the rights of 
freedom of expression and freedom to form societies (but not political parties), and stresses the right of 
women to vote and hold elected office. Qatari officials have stressed that the constitution does not 
preclude the formation of political parties at a later date. While the document calls for an independent 
judiciary to be based on Islamic law— the Constitution clearly states that authority to administer the 
nation's legal code will flow from the Judiciary. While Article I explicitly states that the Shariah is the 
"…main source of legislations…." there is apparently room for something other than literal interpretation in 
applying Islamic law. The constitution allows all religions to practice their faith. Interestingly enough, the 
constitution also outlaws any "offensive" war by the state. 
 
Critics of both templates for democratic reform in Bahrain and Qatar assert that the constitutions continue 
to guarantee the primacy of the ruling al Khalifa and al Thani families and therefore do not constitute 
"true" democracies. Certainly it is the case that both ruling families seek to control the process of political 
reform, which, it is hoped, will be linked to an inevitable process of economic reform. Different challenges 
face the Bahraini and Qatari regimes in the economic sphere.  
With a population of 645,000, a Sunni minority with a history of conflict rules Bahrain with the majority and 
poorer Shias. With almost no oil of its own (35,000 barrels per day in estimated production) and 
dependent in part on Saudi monetary support derived from oil pumped from the Abu Safah oil field, the al 
Khalifa's have been trying with some success to position Manama as a center for oil refining and as a 
regional financial and business center in the Gulf. Like other countries in the region, the economic health 
of Bahrain is directly tied to fluctuations in oil prices. Petroleum production and refining account for about 
60% of export receipts, 60% of government revenues, and 30% of GDP. The World Bank currently 
considers Bahrain a "high income" country, with an estimated 2001 Gross National Income, or GNI, of 
$7.2 billion and a per capita GNI of $11,100.[1] While these figures suggest a relatively healthy economy, 
the numbers hide an income disparity between the Sunnis and the poorer, more numerous Shias. 
Moreover, the absence of a diversified economy and a long term, readily identifiable and predictable 
source of revenue forces the al Khalifa's into a position of having to consider genuine macroeconomic 
reform and all that it entails—increased privatization, domestic taxation, transparency and increased 
foreign investment, if it wishes to spread the wealth more equitably to the Shia majority.  
Qatar's macroeconomic situation has some of the same characteristics, with some important differences. 
Qatar boasts modest oil reserves of 15.2 billion barrels and produces approximately 610,000 barrels of oil 
per day. Oil accounts for more than 30% of GDP, roughly 80% of export earnings, and 58% of 
government revenues. The third largest natural gas reserves in the world in the North Dome field 
(estimated at 509 trillion cubic feet), provide Qatar with a relatively predictable and constant revenue 
stream for the foreseeable future to cushion the process of political and economic transition. Qatar 
boasted an estimated GNI of $16.2 billion in 2002 with an estimated per capita GNI of between $16,000-
$17,000, making it one of the wealthiest countries in the world. Qatar's economic circumstances give it far 
more flexibility in managing the process of transition than Bahrain. 
However the systems in Bahrain and Qatar evolve, the nascent moves in both countries represent an 
important step to introduce more representative forms of government in the region and could provide a 
prelude to the main event, which is taking shape across the 25-kilometer King Fahd Bahrain-Saudi 
Causeway in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
The Main Event? 
Crown Prince Abdullah's meeting on January 20th with a group of some 30-odd petitioners (some of 
whom were jailed as political dissidents 10 years ago) to discuss a "National Reform Document" is a sign 
that change is in the air in Riyadh. Preceding the meeting was the leak of a document titled the "Charter 
for Arab Reform" from Crown Prince Abdullah's office—an unprecedented step from the normally reticent 
House of Saud. Abdullah planned to present the charter for adoption at the Arab League summit to be 
held in Bahrain in March 2003 but has apparently delayed consideration of the charter for another year.  
The charter calls for all Arab states to "…decide that internal reform and enhanced political participation in 
the Arab states are essential steps for the building of Arab capabilities, and for providing the conditions 
for a comprehensive awakening and development of Arab human resources." The charter suggests that 
this process is necessary to ensure "positive integration" into the competitive global marketplace. On the 
economic front, the charter boldly states that "…the present Arab economic cooperation lacks conviction 
and credibility" and calls for the establishment of a Common Arab Market. A building block for these 
economic reforms, according to the Charter, is "…an environment conducive to private initiatives and 
investment which is attractive to both Arab and foreign capital." 
It is unclear whether the Saudis will delay consideration of reforms at home. While Abdullah's January 
20th meeting with the petitioners does not represent an endorsement of their ideas, it suggests that he is 
prepared to address the issue of domestic economic and political reforms head on. The "National Reform 
Document" echoes themes from petitions presented by dissidents in the early 1990s, but represents a 
radical departure in other areas. The dissident petitions in the early 1990s came from religious clerics that 
demanded, among other things, an end to corruption and a return to Islamic roots, an end to foreign 
forces in the Kingdom, an independent judiciary and a foreign policy based on Sharia. The new petition 
echoes the need to ensure that the reform process remains consistent with the Quran and Islamic law 
embodied in the Sharia, but unlike the petitions of the early 1990s, the new petition calls not for a return 
to Islamic roots but for a new form of legislative government with an empowered judiciary. 
The new petition calls for an institutional and constitutional system of government in which legislative, 
executive and judicial authorities are all appropriately separated. Urging an end to the currently appointed 
al Shoura council, the petition calls for direct elections, "from all citizens" for a national-level legislature, 
which would be complemented by regional legislative groups exercising governing authority over regional 
and local issues. For the judiciary, the petition calls for the establishment of a "written national judicial 
code" and "removing provisions and interference, which limit the independence and effectiveness of the 
judiciary, or reduce the judge's immunity." The petitioners urged a royal announcement to ensure citizens' 
rights "…especially in the area of freedom of expressions, assembly, election's rights and all human rights 
which Islam has approved…." 
In the economic sphere, the petition calls for diversifying the economy and for "insisting on the concept 
and fairness in economical plans and distribution of wealth between different regions" as well as "fighting 
corruption and preventing the spreading of bribery and expropriation of public land." The petitioners call to 
reign in public spending and consider "…the national debt a national concern and a major responsibility 
that requires an effective solution to pay it off following a strict time table."  
On the critical role of women's rights, the petition states that "the woman is half the society and a primary 
element in its structure, so she should be given all the rights which Islam has approved, to do her duties 
and activate her role in public affairs, according to the rule of Islam."  
It remains unclear whether the petition represents a realistic roadmap for political and economic reform in 
the Kingdom. But it is certain that the Kingdom faces serious and fundamental macroeconomic 
challenges in the years ahead. According to the International Monetary Fund, Saudi Arabian per capita 
GDP declined by 44 percent over the period 1980-2000 as measured in constant dollars from 
approximately $13,750 to $6699 by 1999.[2] Fueling the erosion of per capita GDP over the period was a 
decline in oil revenues and a burgeoning population. As measured in constant 2000 dollars, Department 
of Energy figures show that Saudi crude oil export earnings totaled $223.2 billion in 1980, declining to an 
estimated $50.4 billion in 2003.[3] The Saudi population rose from 9.9 million in 1980 to around 23.5 
million in 2002. The Saudi population is projected to nearly quadruple over the next 50 years, to just over 
91 million.  
Midyear Population Estimates and Average Annual Period Growth Rates: 
1950 to 2050 
(Population in thousands, rate in percent) 
Year Population Year Population Period Rate 
1950 3,860 1995 18,632 1950-1960 2.0 
1960 4,718 1996 19,290 1960-1970 2.6 
1970 6,109 1997 19,946 1970-1980 4.9 
1980 9,949 1998 20,620 1980-1990 4.7 
1990 15,847 1999 21,311 1990-2000 3.3 
            
2000 22,024 2010 30,546 2000-2010 3.3 
2001 22,757 2020 41,880 2010-2020 3.2 
2002 23,513 2030 55,793 2020-2030 2.9 
2003 24,294 2040 72,294 2030-2040 2.6 
2004 25,100 2050 91,112 2040-2050 2.3 
Source: US Census Bureau, IDB Summary Demographic Data for Saudi Arabia 
 
The unfortunate fact is that nuances in these figures present even more complications in any potential 
economic and political reforms. Nearly 50 percent of the Saudi population is below the age of 15 in a 
widely subscribed educational system that is not preparing its youth for jobs in the global economy. 
Unemployment is variously estimated to run between 25-30 percent of the employable labor pool, a figure 
also distorted by the presence of an estimated 3 million foreign laborers in the Kingdom and the fact that 
Saudi women only constitute an estimated 4 percent of the Kingdom's work force. The Saudi state and 
economy remains almost totally dependent on oil revenues, which represent 90-95 percent of all export 
earnings, 80 percent of state revenues and 40 percent of gross domestic product.[4] Adding to the mix is 
a staggering public sector debt, now totaling an estimated $173 billion by the end of 2002, according to 
figures released by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.[5] The simple fact is that Saudi Arabia cannot 
pump enough oil fast enough to keep pace with this burgeoning population and is facing the prospect of a 
continued decline in per capita GNI over the next 50 years. A jarring economic reform process not unlike 
what happened in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War appears inevitable if the Kingdom is to 
remain as a viable macroeconomic entity. 
Intra-family dynamics in the House of Saud are huge obstacles to any dramatic moves toward reform. As 
Acting Regent, Crown Prince Abdullah must govern by consensus and is hence denied authority that 
would accrue to him if he ruled as king. His two powerful half brothers, Minister of Defense and Aviation, 
Prince Sultan, and Interior Minister Prince Naef, are said to be less enthusiastic about the reform process 
and can effectively prevent Abdullah from moving forward in the reform process. The challenge this 
process poses to the ruling family's purview cannot be underestimated. It raises the specter of an 
accountable, transparent and popularly elected legislature in conjunction with a truly independent 
judiciary that could theoretically place the ruling family within a publicly accountable forum. Ending 
corruption—a common theme with reformers from the early 1990s and today—within the ruling family 
ranks as one of the biggest hurdles to Abdullah gaining the family consensus he needs to move forward 
to meaningful reforms in both the economic and political spheres. 
The role of the religious establishment also presents Abdullah with another wild card. On the one hand, 
the religious establishment would almost certainly oppose the creation of any secular institutions in the 
Kingdom, but on the other, their authority might be actually enhanced within the power structure with the 
creation of some form of Islamist-type political process in a popularly elected legislature. The religious 
establishment itself faces a challenge from a caste of “dissident clerics,” such as Safar Ibn Abd Al-
Rahman Al-Hawali, who are preaching outside the so-called religious mainstream and are regarded as 
being very much tied to the growth of anti-U.S. sentiment in the Kingdom. At this point, it seems unclear 
whether the religious establishment or the dissident clerics are leading or following this trend in public 
sentiment. How these two competing groups interact in an unfolding domestic political process is unclear. 
Both groups could unite, representing a unified “religious” element in a new domestic polity, or conversely 
they could emerge as political rivals. 
The organizational construct of a new domestic political process is an unknown. Qatar’s constitution, for 
example, prevents the formation of political parties, and the Saudis could attempt a similar system. But 
once the process of political reform begins, the population base in Saudi Arabia (numerous, religious, 
youthful and unemployed) suggests that populist-style politics could easily emerge and not be contained 
and channeled as is being attempted in Qatar and Bahrain. Whether called Islamists or something else, 
the religious establishment will invariably become involved in the political process, with unknown 
consequences for the domestic political landscape and the future of the House of Saud. 
Conclusion 
The opening acts in this drama have only just started to unfold, with all eyes anxiously looking upon 
events in Iraq. The direction of this process poses a broad strategic challenge to the international 
community, since the global economy will grow increasingly dependent on oil from the region through the 
rest of the century. Should the process turn to violence, disorder and revolution, the region may well be 
unable to meet the demands being placed upon it by a growing global economy, with dramatic 
consequences for all nations in the international community. Success, however, holds forth the promise of 
a more integrated, stable global political economy. As the guarantor of regional security, the role of the 
United States in this process could be critical, with the challenge being to strike the right balance between 
supportive involvement and sufficient distance to allow the process to unfold at a pace that is defined by 
the region's elites and their publics.  
 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East Resources  
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